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1. Introduction 
 
Formal mathematical modelling of sports leagues began with the work of El-Hodiri 
and Quirk (1971). Such models typically assume that team owners make choices 
about investment in talent, that talent generates wins in the league and that in turn 
wins generate revenues. Predictions are associated with the equilibrium distribution of 
wins either in a profit maximising model (e.g. Atkinson et all (1988), Fort and Quirk 
(1995), Vrooman (1995), Marburger (1997)) or a win maximising model (e.g. 
Kesenne (1996, 2000)). The purpose of this modelling has been to make predictions 
about the impact of policy measures such as gate revenue sharing on quantities such 
as league-wide profits and competitive balance. 
 
In recent years there has been a technical debate in the literature about the way in 
which the model is constructed. Essentially, models that follow in the tradition of El-
Hodiri and Quirk are based on two sets of assumptions 
 
(a) each team owner chooses a quantity of talent to hire in the market, and this 
quantity translates one-for-one into a quantity of wins in the league 
 
(b) equilibrium is identified as the point where marginal benefits are equalised 
across teams (in the profit maximising model this means the point where the 
marginal revenue of a win is equalised, in the win maximisation model it 
means the point where the average revenue of a win is equalised). 
 
Szymanski (2003, 2004a) and Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) take issue with the first 
of these assumptions on both theoretical and practical grounds. In terms of the theory, 
they argue that there is no coherent game theoretic interpretation of the assumption 
that talent has a one-to-one correspondence with wins, since this implies that each 
team is capable of choosing wins independently of the other teams. Logically, the 
wins of one team in a league must depend on the talent choices of the other teams as 
well. More practically, they argue that teams do not in fact choose wins unless they 
are engaged in match fixing. In practice, teams allocate a budget to the hiring of talent 
in the market, with the result that each team’s share of talent in the market is roughly 
proportional to its share of aggregate team budgets. They also show that modelling the   3
choice of budgets as a non-cooperative games generates predictions that are 
dramatically different from the conventional results in the literature.  
 
Some critics view this debate as a rather abstract dispute over modelling assumptions 
with little or no practical consequence. Moreover, the fact the models are usually 
framed using very simple assumptions, most notoriously the “two-team league” 
assumption, others have questioned the practical relevance of the issue.  
 
This paper aims to illustrate the practical relevance of the debate by presenting a 
version of the game theoretic model that can be used for the purposes of classroom 
simulation of a sports league. Engaging students in a simulation brings to life the 
constraints faced by owners and managers in the decision making process. It can also 
help to provide insights into the effectiveness of the types of mechanisms that have 
been designed to alleviate some of the consequences of economic competition 
between teams in a league. The paper provides a full description of the model so that 
the reader can run the simulation model for themselves, and to aid the use of the 
model a spreadsheet version can be downloaded from the author’s personal web 
page.
2 The details of this spreadsheet are also explained in the paper.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the basic assumptions behind the 
model are explained and the way the simulation can be run in class is discussed. The 
following describes the simulation model and assumptions behind it. Section 3 
presents the mathematical model on which the simulation is based and the derivation 
of the Nash equilibrium under profit maximisation and the joint profit maximising 
solution. Section 4 presents the results of some simulations run with students at the 
University of Antwerp and the University of Zurich. Details of the spreadsheet are 






                                                 
2 http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/people/s.szymanski   4
2. The assumptions in the simulation model 
 
The simulation model relates economic inputs to sporting and economic outputs. In 
the model teams hire talent which then produces wins, and wins in turn generates 
profit, which is the difference between the cost of talent and the revenue generated by 
wins. Thus there are two key economic relationships that must be specified:  
 
(a) the relationship between expenditure and success on the playing field 
(b) the relationship between success on the playing field and revenues 
 
These relationships are defined by a set of parameters which characterise the league 
competition in question. The simulation model in this paper is based on empirical 
estimates of these relationships for the American League, one half of Major League 
Baseball, for the year 2003. However, it is quite easy, once the model is understood, 
to develop a model of any league, either using parameters estimated from empirical 
data or based on “guesstimates”.  
 
 
(a) Expenditure and winning 
 
Few would argue against the proposition that teams which spend more on average win 
more on average. A bigger budget for player spending means better players can be 
hired. Because there is a market for playing talent, expenditure is correlated with 
expected success, and actual success is correlated with expected success. Neither of 
these relationships is perfect: sometimes managers make bad choices, and sometimes 
players do not perform as expected (especially when they are injured).  
 
The degree of sensitivity of winning to spending is captured by the Tullock contest 
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Here wi represents the percentage of games played by team i that it wins. If ties 
(draws) are permitted, the each one is treated as half of a win. If there are n teams in 
the league the total win percentages sum to n/2 (e.g. if there are 14 teams, as in the 
American League, then the total percentages won sum to 7 or 700%). Given this total 
to be shared out, equation (1) says that they will be allocated in relation to team 
budgets B, and each team’s share of wins is proportional to its share in total team 
budgets. The degree of sensitivity in this relationship is measured by the parameter γ. 
If γ is very large, then small differences in the Bi’s translate into large differences in 
team performance. If γ equalled zero then spending would make no difference to 
performance. 
 
To illustrate the impact of spending for different values of γ, table 1 shows the 
expected win percentage of a team for a given level of expenditure by other teams in a 
14 team league. 
 
Table 1: Expected win percentages for different levels of expenditure assuming a 
14 team league in which the other teams each spend 100 
 
budget  γ = 1   γ = 0.5  γ = 0.25 
0  0.000 0.000 0.000 
25  0.132 0.259 0.361 
50  0.259 0.361 0.425 
75  0.382 0.437 0.468 
100  0.500 0.500 0.500 
125  0.614 0.554 0.527 
150  0.724 0.603 0.549 
175  0.831 0.647 0.569 
200  0.933 0.687 0.587 
225  1.033 0.724 0.603 
 
 
Note that expected win percentage exceeds the maximum feasible 100% if the budget 
exceeds a critical level. Therefore in the simulation model we introduce an extra 
constraint- if  team i’s budget is such that the value taken by equation (1) would be 
greater than unity, the team’s actual win percentage is constrained to equal unity 
(100% wins).   6
(b) Winning and revenues 
 
The relationship between winning and revenues can be estimated for any given league 
using historical data. Winning increases revenues because the majority of those who 
attend league games support the home team. Home team fans want to see their team 
win. There are a number of factors that are known to increase revenues. In the 
American League it has been shown that the construction of a new ballpark increases 
attendance, while other factors such as past success contribute to wins. The assumed 
relationship between attendance and winning in this model thus takes the form 
 
(2)   Attendancei = ai + bi wi + ci wi
2 
 
The derivation of these coefficients for the American League is explained in the 
appendix. The estimated coefficients, a, b and c for each team are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Estimated parameters for the sensitivity of attendance to wins for the 
American League 
 
Name a  b  c 
Anaheim Angels  1636393 2286830 -821530 
Baltimore Orioles  40217 9250152  -6321152
Boston Red Sox  721947 5382117  -3415917
Chicago White Sox  187050 3517734  -1214034
Cleveland Indians  -632951 10950601 -7713601
Detroit Tigers  -389802 7366947  -4508447
Kansas City Royals  -259625 4852119  -2114319
Minnesota Twins  -1539935 8070813 -3347513
New York Yankees  1045703 5045135 -1895735
Oakland Athletics  -145096 5025231  -1950831
Seattle Mariners  1543096 5363387 -3090087
Tampa Bay Devil Rays  207550 2320631 -523431 
Texas Rangers  1319440 2970135 -1499935
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(c) Playing the Game 
 
Given the parameters of the model the game can now be run on spreadsheet. In order 
to play the game it is useful to provide an instruction sheet (see appendix 1). The 
instruction sheet should explain the relationships above and then participants should 
be invited to choose or allocated a team.  
 
The game is essentially a one-shot game. Each team chooses a budget which, for 
example, they can write down on a decision slip (see appendix 2). Each team does so 
independently and then hands the slip to the instructor. Once they have all been 
collected the instructor inputs the decisions onto the spreadsheet, and the combination 
of individual decisions then determines the win percentage, revenue and profit of each 
team. 
 
The game is best played several times over, in order that students can learn from the 
experiences of earlier rounds. However, it is very important to emphasise to 
participants that the game is one-shot, so that choices made in past rounds do not 
directly affect current decisions, and current decisions have no long term 
consequences (at least directly). It is important to note, however, that teams learn 
about behaviour from previous rounds and that therefore there are some indirect 
effects; indeed, in a sense, this is the whole point of the simulation.
3 
 
Given that we have a relationship between spending and winning (equation 1) and 
between winning and attendance (equation 2), we can calculate the consequences of 
different budget choices made by individual teams. Each team can choose its own 
budget, but the number of wins for each team will depend not only on their own 
budget, but on the budget of every other team. The winning percentage for each team 
then determines attendance.
4 The revenue depends on both attendance and prices. In 
the American League model we assume that each team generates $60 of income per 
                                                 
3 It would be possible without too much manipulation to make the game dynamic, but this would then 
make it difficult or impossible to identify an equilibrium of the game, and students might learn little 
more than the trite observation that “anything can happen”. 
4 Although if spending is low enough, the negative coefficient “a” for some teams implies negative 
attendance. This is ruled out in the spreadsheet by requiring attendance to be non-negative.   8
fan, but in fact the value can be changed in the spreadsheets so that it can be allowed 
to vary for each team. Thus the profit for team i, given equations (1) and (2), is  
 
(3)  πi = pi (ai + bi wi + ci wi
2) – Bi 
 
Where pi is the expected revenue per fan. 
 
It will be noted that so far nothing has been set about objectives. Typically American 
economists have assumed profit maximising behaviour and European economists 
have assumed win maximising behaviour. These assumptions produce different 
theoretical results. However, in the simulation it is up to the instructor to decide how 
to direct the participants. It may in practice be easier to demonstrate the nature of the 
model by asking participants to act as profit maximisers, since there is then a clear 
benchmark for success in game. Indeed, in a classroom situation one might even 
award grades for the level of profits generated. The analogy in a win maximising 
model is that a player of the game is maximally successful if they achieve a budget 
exactly equal to zero, and the closer they are to zero, the greater their success. 
However, it might be argued that there should be asymmetric penalties for over and 
under-spending (since the consequences of overspending are likely to be more 
severe). All this is in the gift of the instructor- the simulation model is consistent with 
any combination of profit maximising and win maximising behaviour. 
 
Before discussing some of the experiences of classes that have played the game, it is 
useful to characterise the Nash equilibrium of the game. 
 
 
3. Nash equilibrium and optimality 
 
Given the assumed objectives of the players, there will in general exist an interior 
Nash equilibrium of the model. Given the choices of every other team, each team 
possesses a “best response”- a choice of budgetary expenditure that maximises each 
team’s objective function. If every team’s budget decision were simultaneously a best   9
response, then the budgets would constitute a “Nash equilibrium”. At a Nash 
equilibrium no team would wish to alter its choice.  
 
The Nash equilibrium is not necessary optimal from the point of view of the league. If 
we were to take the perspective of the league as a whole, imagining it was a cartel 
whose objective was to share out the wins in such a way as to generate the maximum 
possible attendance (and therefore revenue), we would need to identify the point 
where the marginal revenue (MR) of a win was equal for every team. To see why this 
is so, imagine that for a given set of win percentages one team had a higher marginal 
revenue than another. In such a case it would be possible to increase total revenue by 
taking one win away from the low MR team and giving it to the high MR team- the 
gain would outweigh the loss. If all MR’s are equal, however, it is not possible to 
redistribute wins to increase total revenues. Notice that this optimality condition is 
independent of the budgets of the teams- these do not play a role in determining the 
optimal distribution of wins. 
 
 
(a) Deriving the Nash equilibrium 
 
Given (1), (2) and (3) the first order condition for profit to be a maximum is thus 
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so that we can rewrite (4) as  
   10
 
(6)  i i i i i i i B w
n




















However, we can also define the individual budget Bi of a team in terms of the sum of 
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Note that the RHS of (8) is common to all teams. Another way to rewrite the 














j j j j j j i i i i i i w
n
w w c b p w
n












for every team i and j. It is straightforward to solve this system of equations 
numerically if the parameters b, c, p and γ are known. “b” and “c” can be recovered 
by regressing attendance on win percentage, the value of “p”, which is essentially 
revenue per fan, can be derived directly from income statements of the clubs, while γ 
can be derived from the relationship between win percentage and team player budgets 
(appendix 5 describes how this can be done on an Excel spreadsheet). 
   11
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(b) The optimum for the league cartel 
 
We now compare this with the condition for league revenues as a whole to be 
maximised. This requires the marginal revenue of a win to be equalised across teams, 
regardless of budgets. The condition is given by the derivative of (2) with respect to 
winning percentage and hence: 
 
(11)  ) 2 ( ) 2 ( j j j j i i i i w c b p w c b p + = +  
 


















If we sum over all wi not including wj, then 
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but also  
 
(14)  ∑(i≠j) wi = n/2 - wj.   12
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The solution in (15) defines the distribution of win percentages that maximises total 
revenues. A planner interested in maximising total revenue would therefore distribute 
playing talent in such a way as to produce these win percentages. In theory there is no 
need for the planner to use the market mechanism, i.e. playing budgets. However, it is 
possible to identify the budget distribution that would generate the optimal win 
percentages by using (7). For any team the budget must be proportional to  
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Where K is a constant that can be adjusted to define the total player budget. Of 
course, given that only the relative size of the budgets matter for allocating talent, it 
would be possible for the planner to reduce total expenditure to the level of the 
players’ reservation wage. 
 
 
4. The classroom experience  
 
The game has been played by students taking a sports economics class at the 
University of Antwerp and the University of Zurich. Below is described the 
experience of one group. Each team was represented by a single student. 
 
Before making their first decision, the teams were told that the data represented 
roughly the situation in which the American League found itself in 2003, and that in 
fact the teams had spent about $1.2 billion on player salaries. After allowing about 
five minutes to understand the problem (and answering questions of clarification), the 
students were required to submit their budget slips. When each team is represented by   13
a group of students somewhat more discussion time is required. The budget choices 
were then entered into the spreadsheet, and when this was done the outcome was then 







Figure 1: Screen for round 1 of the game 
 
The aggregate spending in the first round was very high- about 30% higher than the 
actual spending. The range varied from $25 million to $210 million. Given that the 
students were supposed to be acting as profit maximisers, those who made losses were 
asked to comment. Most quickly saw that reducing expenditure would increase 
profits. Students could see quite easily that some teams started with a stronger 
supporter base, but that what really mattered in terms of the budget choice was   14
whether the team had a large sensitivity of revenues to wins, captured in the “b” and 
“c” parameters. We then moved to round 2, the results of which are shown in table 3. 
  
 
Table 3: Round 2 of the game 
 Round  2         
Name  budget $m(B) wpc(B)  attendanceRevenue $mprofit $m 
Anaheim Angels  35 0.376 2380244 143 108 
Baltimore Orioles  150 0.779 3410403 205 55 
Boston Red Sox  115 0.682 2803522 168 53 
Chicago White Sox  40 0.402 1405128 84 44 
Cleveland Indians  100 0.636 3211174 193 93 
Detroit Tigers  20 0.284 1340201 80 60 
Kansas City Royals  50 0.450 1494238 90 40 
Minnesota Twins  50 0.450 1411589 85 35 
New York Yankees  180 0.853 3969648 238 58 
Oakland Athletics  80 0.569 2081514 125 45 
Seattle Mariners  18 0.270 2764861 166 148 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays  40 0.402 1055961 63 23 
Texas Rangers  90 0.603 2565138 154 64 
Toronto Blue Jays  15 0.246 990124.9 59 44 
          
Sum 983  30883745 1853 870 
standard deviation    0.191     
 
Total spending was nearly halved. Revenues, however, fell only slightly, and 
therefore profits were three times larger than in the first round. Note that the variance 
of win percentages also increased, since the few teams that continued to spend at a 
high level achieved very high win percentages (and relatively low profits). The 
concept of a best response was now discussed- could each team identify a best 
response? We then moved to round 3, the results of which are shown in Table 5.  
 
By round 3 every team had recognised the advantage to keeping spending down and 
aggregate spending was now one third of the level in the first round, and profits were 
about four times larger. Now students found that changing their decision made very 
little difference to total profit- most teams were close to their best response. Round 4 
(Table 6) illustrated that the group was getting closer to an equilibrium. 
 
   15
Table 5: Round 3 of the game 
 
 Round  3         
Name  budget $m(B) wpc(B)  attendancerevenue $mprofit $m 
Anaheim Angels  20 0.361 2355599 141 121 
Baltimore Orioles  40 0.511 3116837 187 147 
Boston Red Sox  60 0.626 2752548 165 105 
Chicago White Sox  25 0.404 1410288 85 60 
Cleveland Indians  80 0.723 3252240 195 115 
Detroit Tigers  15 0.313 1474388 88 73 
Kansas City Royals  10 0.256 842323.2 51 41 
Minnesota Twins  30 0.443 1376733 83 53 
New York Yankees  90 0.767 3799447 228 138 
Oakland Athletics  80 0.723 2468070 148 68 
Seattle Mariners  12 0.280 2802438 168 156 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays  50 0.571 1362774 82 32 
Texas Rangers  90 0.767 2714939 163 73 
Toronto Blue Jays  10 0.256 1014750 61 51 
          
Sum 612  30743373 1845 1233 
standard deviation    0.196     
 
 
Table 6: Round 4 of the game 
 
 Round  4         
name  budget $m(B) wpc(B)  attendancerevenue $mprofit $m 
Anaheim Angels  25 0.381 2388561 143 118 
Baltimore Orioles  50 0.539 3189463 191 141 
Boston Red Sox  45 0.511 2580768 155 110 
Chicago White Sox  30 0.417 1443983 87 57 
Cleveland Indians  65 0.614 3183429 191 126 
Detroit Tigers  50 0.539 2271021 136 86 
Kansas City Royals  30 0.417 1397464 84 54 
Minnesota Twins  55 0.565 1952493 117 62 
New York Yankees  80 0.682 3604008 216 136 
Oakland Athletics  70 0.638 2266107 136 66 
Seattle Mariners  13 0.275 2783622 167 154 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays  45 0.511 1257211 75 30 
Texas Rangers  65 0.614 2578175 155 90 
Toronto Blue Jays  15 0.295 1117191 67 52 
          
Sum 638  32013496 1921 1283 
standard deviation    0.126     
 
 
In this round the aggregate result was quite similar to the previous round. As a result, 
although some groups changed their budget quite significantly, it proved harder to   16
affect profits significantly. This led naturally to a discussion of the idea that each team 
might simultaneously be at a best response. Some thought this was possible, others 
not. At this point the concept of the Nash equilibrium was introduced and the relevant 
values shown on the spreadsheet. As a final stage in the exercise the, distribution of 
wins which maximises total attendance was examined, this being different from the 
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Appendix 1: Instructions for participants in the American League game. 
 
(NB the spreadsheet for the game can be downloaded at http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/people/s.szymanski) 
 
Imagine you are the owner of a team in the American League and that your sole 
objective is to maximise profits. Profits equal revenues minus costs. Costs equal the 
budget devoted to hiring playing talent. Revenue depends on the percentage of games 
won, which can range between zero and 100%. The exact relationships depend on the 

















   (The  pay-performance  relationship) 
 
 
(2)   Attendancei = ai + bi wi + ci wi
2  (The attendance-win relationship)  
 
 
The pay-performance relationship 
 
Here wi represents the percentage of games played by team i that it wins. For n teams 
in the league the total win percentages sum to n/2. In the American League there are 
14 teams and so the total percentages won sum to 7 (700%). B is the team budgets and 
each team’s share of wins is proportional to its share in total team budgets. The degree 
of sensitivity in this relationship is measured by the parameter γ. If γ is very large, 
then small differences in γ translate into large differences in team performance. If γ 
equalled zero then spending would make no difference to performance. To illustrate 
the impact of spending for different values of γ, table 1 shows the expected win 
percentage of a team for a given level of expenditure by other teams in a 14 team 
league. 
 
Table 1: Expected win percentages for different levels of expenditure assuming a 
14 team league in which the other teams each spend 100 
 
budget  γ = 1   γ = 0.5  γ = 0.25 
0  0.000 0.000 0.000 
25  0.132 0.259 0.361 
50  0.259 0.361 0.425 
75  0.382 0.437 0.468 
100  0.500 0.500 0.500 
125  0.614 0.554 0.527 
150  0.724 0.603 0.549 
175  0.831 0.647 0.569 
200  0.933 0.687 0.587 
225  1.033 0.724 0.603 
 
In the game a value of γ = 0.5 will be assumed.   18
N.B. If  team i’s budget is such that the value taken by equation (1) would be greater 




The attendance-win relationship 
 
The attendance relationship is based on historic data. For each team there is a 
quadratic relationship which reaches a maximum at some positive win percentage, but 
that critical value can be greater than 100%. 
 
Table 2: Estimated parameters for the sensitivity of attendance to wins for the 
American League 
 
Name a  b  c 
Anaheim Angels  1636393 2286830 -821530 
Baltimore Orioles  40217 9250152  -6321152
Boston Red Sox  721947 5382117  -3415917
Chicago White Sox  187050 3517734  -1214034
Cleveland Indians  -632951 10950601 -7713601
Detroit Tigers  -389802 7366947  -4508447
Kansas City Royals  -259625 4852119  -2114319
Minnesota Twins  -1539935 8070813 -3347513
New York Yankees  1045703 5045135 -1895735
Oakland Athletics  -145096 5025231  -1950831
Seattle Mariners  1543096 5363387 -3090087
Tampa Bay Devil Rays  207550 2320631 -523431 
Texas Rangers  1319440 2970135 -1499935
Toronto Blue Jays  284278 3094233 -923433 
 
 
N.B. Given the values of “a” in Table 2, it would be possible for a team to have 
negative attendance if the team won few games. This is ruled out by constraining 
attendance to be non-negative. 
 
Given these two relationships profit equals 
 
(3)  πi = pi (ai + bi wi + ci wi
2) – Bi 
 
For this simulation we assume pi (average revenue per fan) is equal to $60 for each 
team. 
 
Rules of the game 
 
Each team is required to choose a positive and finite budget figure. Collusion is not 
permitted. Based on these choices the win percentage, revenue and profit of each team 
will be determined. If more than one round is played, there is no connection between 
the decisions in one round and the decisions in any other. 
   19














































Budget $m: ____________   20
Appendix 3: How to solve for the Nash equilibrium budgets on an Excel 
spreadsheet 
 
1.  The input data required for this exercise consists of the parameters  bi and ci , 
revenue per fan pi , which should be defined in three separate columns, say 
columns A, B and C. 
2.  Define the win percentages in column D using equation (1) where the Bi are 
numbers inputted in column E, which we can label “Rbudgets” and the 
parameter γ, defined in a free cell (for example, in a 14 team league, where the 
names are defined in the first row and the next 14 rows contain the team data, 
cell A17 could be used for the value of γ). 
3.  In column F input the formula for LHS of the equilibrium condition (9). This 
depends on the parameters  bi (column A) and ci (column B), revenue per fan 
pi (column C), the number of teams in the league n, and the win percentages 
defined in column D. 
4.  Underneath the figures column F input the average value of these figures. 
5.  In column G input the difference between value for the team in column F and 
the average value for column F. 
6.  From column G identify the team whose deviation from the average is largest 
and then adjust this team’s Rbudget figure in column E until the deviation is 
zero (or close to zero). 
7.  Repeat step 5 as often as is necessary to reduce all of the deviations as close to 
zero as is required. Note that as the deviations in column G approach zero the 
values in column F approach equality, thus satisfying equilibrium condition 
(9). 
8.  To derive team budgets from the Rbudget figures in column E, input in 
column H the LHS of equation (6), which depends on the win percentages in 
column D, the parameters  bi (column A), ci (column B), revenue per fan pi 
(column C), the number of teams n and γ. The figures in column H are thus the 
Nash equilibrium budgets (Rbudgets are proportional to the Nash Equilibrium 
budgets, but only ensure that the marginal revenue of budget spending is 
equalised across all teams. For Nash equilibrium we also require that marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost). 
   21
Appendix 4: a list of sheets from the Excel file 
 
Base data: attendance and win percent data for the American League. Other variables 
include dummies for date of a new ballpark opened and league honours won.  
 
Expenditure and winning: This sheet uses the minimum sum of squared deviations 
to estimate the value of γ which best fits the data on wages and win percent using 
equation (1). 
 
Revenue and costs AL 03: This is actual revenue and cost data for the American 
League in 2003 
 
Regression Results: This sheet shows the results of the linear regressions of 
attendance on win percent. 
 
Quadratic estimates: This sheet shows how the quadratic parameter estimates were 
derived. The method is explained in Szymanski (2004b). 
 
Attendance and winning (chart): This shows the relationship between attendance 
and win percentage for some of the teams. 
 
Model: This is sheet used to input the budget choices made by participants in the 
simulation. 
 
Results: This sheet should be used to keep a record (by cutting and pasting) of each 
round. 
 
NE g = 0.16: This sheet gives the Nash equilibrium choices when γ = 0.16, assuming 
profit maximisation. 
 
NE g = 0.25: This sheet gives the Nash equilibrium choices when γ = 0.25, assuming 
profit maximisation. 
 
NE g = 0.5: This sheet gives the Nash equilibrium choices when γ = 0.5, assuming 
profit maximisation. 
 
NE g = 1: This sheet gives the Nash equilibrium choices when γ = 1, assuming profit 
maximisation. 
 
Planner’s equilibrium: This sheet gives the distribution of win percentages that 
maximises total attendance 
 
Summary: This sheet summarises all the relevant variables for the different Nash 
equilibria and the planner’s equilibrium. It also gives the budget choices when teams 
are win maximisers. Note that for some values of γ, there are some clubs that cannot 
avoid losses when all teams are win maximisers.  22
Appendix 5: A note on parameter values in the model 
 
(a) the value of γ 
 
For the simulation a value of γ equal to ½ is convenient. It is possible, however, to 
derive a value of γ. The sheet labelled “Expenditure and winning” estimates the 
parameter γ using data from the American League for the period 1988-2004. This is 
done by defining the expected win percentage for each team in each season based on 
the payrolls of all team specified in equation (1), and then varying the parameter γ so 
the sum of squared deviations of expected from actual win percentage is minimised. 
The value of γ that does this for the American League is 0.16, suggesting a relatively 
low sensitivity. Estimates for other leagues at other times could differ significantly. 
 
 
(b) the value of the “a”, “b” and “c” parameters 
 
Using the “Base data” sheet, the “regression results” shows the econometric results 
for the relationship between attendance at the ballpark and these factors. For each 
club, an increase in winning percentage increases attendance, but at each club the 
sensitivity varies.  
 
The estimated relationship is linear, suggesting that, whatever, the level of win 
percentage, an addition to win percentage produces the same increase in attendance. 
More realistically, it might be expected that increases in win percentages produce a 
smaller and smaller addition to attendance (diminishing returns). It might even be the 
case that attendance decreased if win percentage rose too high, since fans would lose 
the element of unpredictability that makes sporting contests attractive. 
 
This non-linearity is hard to estimate for the American League, since teams seldom 
achieve extreme win percentages. Out of the 363 team seasons in the database here, 
there were only three cases of win percentages below 33% and only three above 66% 
(the highest was 71% and the lowest 26%). However, it is likely that if a team won 
more than 80% of its games it would at least start to face capacity constraints. The 
sheet “quadratic estimates” shows a non-linear estimate can be produced from the 
regression results and the assumption of a capacity constraint, and the chart 
“Attendance and winning” illustrates the relationship for several clubs.    23
References 
 
Atkinson, Scott, Linda Stanley and John Tschirhart. 1988. “Revenue Sharing as an 
incentive in an agency problem: an example from the National Football League” Rand 
Journal of Economics, 19, 1, 27-43 
 
El-Hodiri, Mohamed and James Quirk. 1971. “An Economic Model of a Professional 
Sports League” Journal of Political Economy, 79, 1302-19 
 
Fort, Rodney and James Quirk. 1995. “Cross Subsidization, Incentives and Outcomes 
in Professional Team Sports Leagues” Journal of Economic Literature, XXXIII, 3, 
1265-1299 
 
Késenne, Stefan. 1996 “League Management in Professional Team Sports with Win 
Maximizing Clubs”, European Journal for Sport Management, vol. 2/ 2, pp. 14-22 
 
Késenne, Stefan. 2000. “Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional 
Team Sports” Journal of Sports Economics, Vol 1, No 1, pp56-65. 
 
Marburger, Daniel. 1997. "Gate revenue sharing and luxury taxes in professional 
sports" Contemporary Economic Policy, XV, April, 114-123. 
 
Stefan Szymanski, 2003. “The Economic Design of Sporting Contests” Journal of 
Economic Literature, XLI, 1137- 1187. 
 
Stefan Szymanski, 2004a, “Professional team sports are only a game: the Walrasian 
fixed supply conjecture model, Contest-Nash equilibrium and the Invariance 
Principle” Journal of Sports Economics, 5, 2, 111-126. 
 
Stefan Szymanski, 2004b, “Tilting the Playing Field: Why a sports league planner 
would choose less, not more, competitive balance”, mimeo.  
 
Stefan Szymanski and Stefan Késenne, 2004. “Competitive balance and gate revenue 
sharing in team sports” Journal of Industrial Economics, LII, 1, 165-177. 
 
Vrooman, John. 1995. “A General Theory of Professional Sports Leagues” Southern 
Economic Journal, 61, 4, 971-90 
 